CONSTITUTIONAL
PLOYEES'

LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-PUBLIC
EMRIGHT TO FREE SPEECH IN THE WORKPLACE Ex-

PANDED-Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987).

The United States Constitution guarantees that freedom of
speech will not be abridged.' In interpreting this seemingly absolute right, however, the Supreme Court has declared that certain forms of speech do not enjoy full constitutional protection.2
This has been the case with public employees' right to free
speech in the workplace. 3
U.S. CONST. amend. I. In interpreting the first amendment, at least one commentator has suggested that first amendment rights are "absolute" in that they are
not subject to exceptions. See Meikeljohn, The FirstAmendment is an Absolute, Sup. CT.
REV. 245, 248 (1961). In adopting this "absolutist" position, Justice Black has
explained:
To my way of thinking, at least, the history and language of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights .

.

. make it plain that one of the

primary purposes of the Constitution with its amendments was to withdraw from the Government all power to act in certain areas-whatever
the scope of those areas may be.
Black, Bill of Rights, reprinted in 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865, 874-75 (1960).
In rejecting Justice Black's position, and advocating a "balance" between the
rights of the individual and the interests of the government, Justice Harlan has
stated:
At the outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and association .

.

. as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are

"absolutes," not only in the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail, but also in the sense that the
scope of that protection must be gathered solely through a literal reading of the First Amendment.
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961).
2 The Court has determined that certain types of speech are beyond the scope
of constitutional protection. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (libelous utterances); Harisiades v. Shaughnessey, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (advocacy of force or violence);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); Frohwerk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (seditious utterances). One commentator has
explained that the government "abridges" speech in these instances because of the
specific idea expressed or because of the effect produced by the awareness of such
idea. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAw § 12-2, at 789-90 (2d ed. 1988).
The Court has also identified other forms of speech as those deserving a lesser
degree of constitutional protection. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (commercial speech); F.C.C. v Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978) (offensive speech); Young v. American Mini-Theaters, Inc., 427
U.S. 50 (1976) (near-obscene speech); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968) (public employee speech). Speech in these categories has been described as
belonging to an "intermediate category" which receives "less-than-complete constitutional protection." L.TRIBE, supra, § 12-18, at 930.
3 See infra notes 31-115 and accompanying text. See also Rosenbloom, The Constitution and the Civil Service: Some Recent Developments, Judicialand Political, 18 U. KAN. L.
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With respect to the public sector,4 the Supreme Court has
struggled to articulate the appropriate standards to govern free
speech claims of employees. 5 As a threshold issue, the Court has
required that employee speech address a matter of public concern to enjoy constitutional protection. 6 Additionally, an employee's right to comment on matters of public concern must
outweigh the government's interests in efficiency and harmony in
the workplace. 7 Relying on this established framework, the
Court in Rankin v. McPhersonI broadly interpreted the concept of
public concern, and in balancing the competing interests involved, focused on the actual disruption that occurred in the
workplace. 9
In January of 1981, Ardith McPherson, a nineteen-year-old
black woman, was hired by the constable's office in Harris
County, Texas, to work as a data entry clerk.' ° The constable's
office was charged with certain limited law enforcement functions," and all employees in the office held the title of deputy
839, 840-55 (1970) (tracing the Supreme Court's treatment of first amendment protection extended to public employees).
4 Employment relationships in the public sector involve the state action necessary to trigger first amendment analysis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See Rankin
v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987). Employment relationships in the private
sector, however, are generally governed by the "employment at will" doctrine,
which dictates that an employee may be terminated "for good cause, for no cause
or even for cause morally wrong." Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507,
519-20 (1884), overruled on othergrounds, Hutton v. Waters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S. W.
134 (1915). Employees subject to employment at will are afforded first amendment
protection under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168
(1982), and under common law remedies for the tort of wrongful discharge. See
Halbert, The First Amendment in the Workplace: An Analysis and Callfor Reform, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 42, 53-60 (1987) (discussing first amendment protection afforded
private employees under constitutional, statutory and common law).
5 See e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (public employee speech must
address a matter of public concern); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968) (balance between interests of government and rights of employee must be
struck); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (public employment
may not be conditioned on surrender of constitutional rights); McAuliffe v. Mayor
of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892) (any reasonable restraint on
public employee speech permissible).
6 See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-48 (1983).
7 See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
8 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987).
9 Id. at 2898-99.
10 Id. at 2894-95. McPherson was only required to pass a typing test to qualify
for this position. Brief for Respondent at 4, Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891
(1987) (No. 85-2068).
11 See Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2894. Constable Rankin testified that the major function of the constable's office was the service of civil process in Harris County. Id. at
2891 n. 1. In fact, 80% of the office's budget is devoted to this function. Id. The
REV.
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constable.' 2 Although she held this title, McPherson was not a
commissioned officer and had no law enforcement responsibilities.' 3 Rather, her duties were limited to operating a computer
terminal in a private office, allowing her no contact with the public in the course of her job.' 4
/
On March 30th, 1981, McPherson and three co-employees
heard an announcement over an office radio that an attempt had
been made to assassinate President Reagan.' 5 Upon hearing the
news, McPherson began discussing the event and the policies of
the Reagan administration with a fellow employee, Lawrence
Jackson.' 6 McPherson first commented that she thought the attempted assassination would happen "sooner or later" and that
"it would be [done by] a black person.., because.., most [are]
on welfare and CETA, and . . . use medicaid."' 17 When Jackson
commented that the Reagan administration had been reducing
medicaid and food stamp payments, McPherson responded,
"shoot, if they go for him again, I hope they get him."' 8
Unbeknownst to McPherson, another deputy constable had
routine enforcement of criminal laws is done by the local police departments. See
id.
12 Id. at 2894. McPherson held the title of deputy constable only because all
persons employed by the constable's office, regardless of their function, were given
the title. Id.
McPherson was required to give the following oath of office: "I, Ardith S.
McPherson, do solemnly swear (or affirm), that I will faithfully execute the duties of
Clerk of Harris County, Texas, and will to the best of my ability preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States and of this [s]tate." McPherson v. Rankin, No. H-81-1442, 37 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 1983), vacated and remanded, 736 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 786 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 107
S. Ct. 2891 (1987).
13 Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2894. McPherson did not wear an official uniform. Id.
Additionally, McPherson was neither permitted to carry a gun nor authorized to
make arrests. Id.
'4 Id. at 2894-95. McPherson's primary responsibility was typing data into a
computer which recorded the service of civil process in the county. Id. at 2895.
15 See id. Both McPherson and her co-employees were situated at their computer
terminals which were only a few feet apart when they heard the news report. Brief
for Respondent, supra note 10, at 5.
16 See Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2895.
17 Id.
18 Id. Initially, the district court found McPherson's comment to be: "I hope if
they go for him again, they get him." McPherson v. Rankin, No. H-81-1442, 38
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 1983), vacated and remanded, 736 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1984), rev'd,
786 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987). On remand, the district court made no explicit finding regarding McPherson's statement. McPherson
v. Rankin, No. H-81-1442 at 179 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 1985), rev'd, 786 F.2d 1233
(5th Cir. 1986), aft'd, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987). The Supreme Court found that the
distinction between the two versions was not significant. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2895
n.3.
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entered the room during the broadcast and overheard her last
comment.' 9 He immediately related the remark to Constable
Rankin, who then summoned McPherson to his office.20 When
asked by Rankin if she had made the comment, McPherson admitted that she had, but later testified that she also explained to
him that she did not mean anything by it.222 ' Immediately after the
confrontation, Rankin fired McPherson.
McPherson brought an action in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging that Rankin
discharged her in violation of her first amendment rights. 23 After
a hearing, the district court granted defendant Rankin's motion
for summary judgment. 4 Subsequently, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded for a trial on the merits, noting that genuine issues of material fact remained concerning the context in which McPherson made her statement. 25 On
remand, the district court ruled that McPherson's remarks were
not constitutionally
protected and again entered judgment for
26
the defendant.
19 Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2895.

Id.
Id. In the first hearing of the case, Rankin testified that when he asked McPherson if she meant it, she responded, "I sure do." McPherson, No. H-81-1442 at
38. In both trial level proceedings, the district courts made no explicit finding regarding which statement they found credible. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2895 n.4. In
the second hearing, however, Judge Black noted: "I don't believe she meant nothing, as she said here today, and I don't believe that those words were mere political
hyperbole. They were something more than political hyperbole. They expressed
such dislike of a high public government official as to be violent words, in context."
McPherson, No. H-81-1442 at 181.
22 Rankin, 107 S.Ct. at 2895.
23 Id. McPherson brought the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides, in
pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of [law] . ..subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States ...to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Rankin sought recovery for lost wages, costs and fees as
well as reinstatement of her position and other equitable relief. Rankin, 107 S.Ct.
at 2895.
24 McPherson v. Rankin, No. H-81-1442 (S. D. Tex. Apr. 15, 1983), vacated and
remanded, 736 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 786 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd,
107 S.Ct. 2891 (1987). The court granted this motion on the ground that McPherson's discharge had been proper since her remarks were not constitutionally protected. McPherson, No. H-81-1442 at 8.
25 McPherson, 736 F.2d at 180.
26 McPherson v. Rankin, No. H-81-1442 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 1985), rev'd, 786
F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987).
20
21
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On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, recognizing McPherson's superior right to free speech in the workplace.2 7 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 8 and affirmed
the decision of the court of appeals.2 9 In so doing, the Supreme
Court held that McPherson's remark addressed a matter of public
concern, and that her interest in speaking outweighed her employer's interests in efficiency and discipline in the workplace. °
Historically, the first amendment rights of public employees
were severely restricted in the workplace. 3 1 Since public employment was considered a privilege and not a right, the government
could place any conditions on employment which were considered "reasonable. ' 3 2 This limited view of constitutional protection was expressed by Justice Holmes in McAulife v. Mayor of New
Bedford3 3 when he determined that a "[policeman] may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
34
right to be a policeman."
27 McPherson, 786 F.2d at 1238-39. Upon finding that McPherson's speech addressed a matter of public concern, the court then determined that her first amendment rights outweighed the countervailing interests of her employer. Id. In so
holding, the court employed the standards set forth by the Supreme Court to evaluate public employees free speech claims. Id. at 1235-36 (citing Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 140-51 (1983)).
28 Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 313 (1986).
29 See Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987).
30 Id. at 2897-900.
31 See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Board of
Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75
(1947).
32 See generally Note, The FirstAmendment and Public Employees-An Emerging Constitutional Right to be a Policeman?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 409, 409 (1968) (authored by
Henry V. Nickel); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1442-45 (1968) (examining the history of the
right/privilege distinction and its harsh consequences); Rosenbloom, supra note 3,
at 839-40 (examining the judicial development of the doctrine of privilege). Professor Rosenbloom explains the premise underlying conditional public employment as
follows: "[W]hen a citizen accepts public employment he voluntarily accepts all the
conditions which go with it. Although these conditions may interfere with the employee's constitutional rights, his rights are not violated in the constitutional sense
because his acceptance of these restrictions is voluntary rather than compelled." Id.
at 840.
33 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
34 Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517. Justice Holmes further stated:
There are few [employment opportunities] for hire in which the servant
does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well
as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot
complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered
him. On the same principle the city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control.
Id. at 220-21, 29 N.E. at 517-18. This view was also expressed in Ex parte Curtis,
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This right/privilege distinction was maintained by the Court
in early cases involving associational rights of public employees. 3 5 In a leading case, Adler v. Board of Education, 6 school teachers challenged the constitutionality of a New York statute which

prohibited employment of persons who belonged to any organization which advocated the unlawful overthrow of the government.

7

Applying the Holmes rationale, the Court determined

that such reasonable conditions of employment did not infringe
upon the employees' right to free speech3 8 Declining to define
public employment as a "right," the Court suggested that employees who are not satisfied with the terms of their employment
are free "to retain their beliefs and associations and [seek work]

elsewhere. "3
The Court eventually modified
faced with constitutional challenges
oaths.4 ° In Wieman v. Updegraff,4 the
stitutionality of an Oklahoma statute

its position in Adler when
to state-mandated loyalty
Court considered the conwhich required candidates

for state employment to disclaim membership in communist or
other subversive organizations as a condition of employment.4 2
106 U.S. 371 (1882), where the Court upheld a federal statute regulating the political activities of federal employees. Curtis, 106 U.S. at 375.
35 See, e.g., Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (dismissal of city
employee for failure to execute a "loyalty" oath upheld); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (statute requiring candidates for public office to take
oath upheld); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (statute restricting the political activities of federal employees upheld); United States v. Wurzbach,
280 U.S. 396 (1930) (statute forbidding members of Congress from receiving political contributions upheld).
36 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
37 Id. at 486-87. The statute made any employee ineligible for employment or
subject to dismissal who "helps to organize or becomes a member of any society or
group of persons which teaches or advocates that the government of the United
States or of any state ... shall be overthrown by force or violence, or by any unlawful means." The Feinberg Law, N.Y. LAws ch. 360 (1949), as amended by N.Y. LAws,
ch. 681, § I (1953), amending N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3022 (McKinney 1953) (repealed
1967).
38 See Adler, 342 U.S. at 492.
39 Id.
40 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Cramp v. Board
of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952).
41 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
42 Id. at 186. The statute provided, in part, that all state officers and employees
must take a loyalty oath as a condition of employment. The oath required an employee to affirm that he was not a member of any organization which advocated the
overthrow of the United States government. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 37.1 - .8
(West Supp. 1952) (repealed 1953). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld the
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Distinguishing prior case law involving similar statutes, 43 the majority held that the denial of employment solely on the basis of
innocent association violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 4 While the Court did not explicitly abandon
the right/privilege distinction, it did acknowledge that constitutional protection attaches when the denial of public employment
is patently arbitrary or discriminatory. 4 5
During the following decade, the Court continued to protect
the constitutional rights of public employees in certain areas.4 6
In 1960, the Court in Shelton v. Tucker 47 struck down an Arkansas
statute which required teachers to disclose any organization to
which they belonged or contributed within the past five years.4 8
Citing Wieman for the proposition that the fourteenth amendment protects all persons "no matter what their calling," '4 9 the
Court held that such a disclosure requirement violated the associational freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. 50 Similarly,
in Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction,5 1 an employee challenged
constitutionality of the act without considering whether the employee had knowledge of the organization's subversive activities. Board of Regents v. Updegraff, 205
Okla. 301, 237 P.2d 131 (1951), rev'd sub nom. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
(1952).
43 The Court noted that in prior cases, the statutes involved were construed to
require scienter before state employment could be denied on disloyalty grounds.
Wieman, 344 U.S. at 188-91 (citing Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716
(1951); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952)). In the present case, however, the Court noted that the statute was broadly interpreted to deny employment
solely on the basis of membership, which included innocent association with an
organization. Id.at 190.
44 See id.
at 191.
45 See id.
at 191-92.
46 See, e.g.,
Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). See Note,
Public Employees' Free Speech Rights: Connick v. Myers Upsets the Delicate Pickering Balance, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 173, 174 (1984-85) (authored by Andrew C.
Alter).
47 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
48 Id. at 480-81. Specifically, the statute in question compelled every teacher, as
a condition of employment to annually file a statement listing every organization to
which he had belonged for the past five years. Id. Further, the statute provided
that any contract entered into with a teacher who had not signed the statute was
void. Id.
49 Id. at 487 (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring)).
50 Id.at 490. The Court noted that the "indiscriminate sweep of the statute"
violated the due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Id. The majority
explained that "[the statute's comprehensive interference with associational freedom goes far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the [s]tate's legitimate inquiry into the fitness and competency of its teachers." Id.
51 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
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the validity of a mandatory loyalty oath which precluded those
who lent their "aid, support, advice [or] counsel" to the communist party from obtaining state employment. 52 Recognizing the
inherent vagueness of such an oath, the Court struck down the
statute as violative of the fourteenth amendment. 53 By holding
that state employment should not be conditioned with arbitrary
restrictions, the majority in both cases indicated
a growing
54
awareness of public servants' constitutional rights.
The Court continued to limit the scope of permissible conditions which could be placed on public privileges as evidenced by
its decision in Sherbert v. Verner.5 5 In construing the free exercise
clause of the first amendment, the majority in Sherbert determined
that "the liberties of religion and expression may [not] be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or
privilege. "56 This reasoning laid the foundation for the Court's
ultimate rejection of the right/privilege distinction in Keyishian v.
Board of Regents.57 In Keyishian, the Court invalidated the statute
at issue in Adler, which required teachers to deny membership in
communist organizations as a condition of employment.58 In so
52 Id. at 279-80. The plaintiff, a Florida school teacher, refused to take the oath,
although he maintained that he was not involved in any of the forbidden activities.
Id. at 280. He alleged that he was unlawfully terminated in violation of his first and
fourteenth amendment rights. Id.
53 Id. at 288. The Court explained that a statute is unconstitutionally vague
when reasonable persons could disagree as to the meaning of its language and the
scope of its application. Id. at 287 (citing Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1926)). Moreover, in Cramp, the Court noted that the statute's unconstitutional vagueness was compounded by the fact that it also interfered with first
amendment rights. See id. at 287-88 (citations omitted).
54 In both cases, the Court relied on Wieman in holding that the imposition of
arbitrary restrictions on public employees first amendment rights violates the fourteenth amendment. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 288 (1961)
(citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952)); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952)). See
generally Note, Connick v. Myers: Narrowing the Free Speech Right of PublicEmployees, 33
CATH. U. L. REV. 429 (1984) (authored by Stephen Allred) (discussing the historical
emergence of public employees' first amendment rights).
55 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court struck down a South Carolina statute which denied unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist whose religious beliefs prevented her from working on Saturday. Id. at 404. The Court
determined that the statute violated the free exercise clause of the first amendment.
Id. See also Note, supra note 32, at 412 (discussing the development of Sherbert in the
employee rights context).
56 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92
(1952); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 390 (1950);
Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1946)).
57 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
58 Id. at 608. More specifically, pursuant to the statute, a presumption of dis-
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doing, the Court rejected the notion that "public employment
. . . may be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional

rights which could not be abridged by direct government action."' 59 Thus, Keyishian established the principle that public employment, once granted, may not be restricted by otherwise
unconstitutional conditions.60
In the year following Keyishian, the Court retreated from
vagueness and overbreadth analysis and instead developed more
specific guidelines for evaluating public employee free speech
claims. 6 ' In Pickering v. Board of Education,62 the school board dismissed a teacher after he wrote a letter to the local newspaper
criticizing certain board policies.63 In reviewing Pickering's
claim, the Court initially noted that an employee cannot be dismissed for exercising his first amendment rights, unless he has
made knowingly false or reckless statements. 64 Conversely, the
Court maintained that in the context of public employment, certain state interests may justify imposing conditions which would
otherwise be unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.65
qualification arose from proof of membership. Id. This presumption could be rebutted by denying membership in such an organization, by denying that such an
organization condones the overthrow of government by violence or by denying
knowledge of such advocacy. Id. In this regard, the Court held that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id. at 609.
59 Id. at 605.
60 See id. at 609-10. See also Lee, Freedom of Speech in The Public Workplace: A Com-

ment on the Public Concern Requirement, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (1988) ("The
Court [in Keyishian] articulated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.").
61 See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1968). See generally,
Note, Free Speech and Impermissible Motive in the Dismissal of Public Employees, 89 YALE L.
J. 376, 381 (1979) (discussing the impact of the Picketing decisiori).
62 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
63 Id. at 564-65. The school board dismissed Pickering after a full hearing
before the board and a determination that the publication of the letter was "detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools of the district,"
and thus, in contravention of the applicable Illinois law. Id.
64 Id. at 574. The Court noted that the "core value[s]" of the first amendment
are best served by having "free and unlimited debate on issues of public importance." See id. at 573. In so doing, the majority noted that recovery of damages by
public officials for statements made about them are not authorized unless such
statements are made with either knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for
their truth. Id. (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). Similarly,
the Court held that in the instant case, "absent proof of false statements knowingly
or recklessly made by [Pickering, his] exercise of his right to speak on issues of
public importance may not furnish the basis for dismissal from public employment." Id. at 574. For a discussion of Pickering and New York Times, see Note, Teachers' Freedom of Expression Outside the Classroom: An Analysis of the Application of Pickering
and Tinker, 8 GA. L. REV. 900, 904 n.23 (1974).
65 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. For a discussion of the weights assigned to the state
interests in various occupations, see Note, supra note 61, at 381 n.43.
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Faced with these competing interests, the Court developed a balancing test in which the rights of the employee, in commenting
upon matters of public concern, would be weighed against the
66
state's interest in promoting the efficiency of its public service.
Recognizing the impracticability of setting forth a general
standard upon which all statements could be judged, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, framed the balancing test in broad
terms.6 7 At the outset, he articulated several factors relevant to
analyzing a constitutional claim.68 When the parties' working relationship does not require confidence and loyalty in order to
function properly, the Court reasoned that the state's interest in
restricting the speech is weakened. 69 By contrast, the majority
noted that any detrimental impact that the speech might have on
the efficient functioning of the government will tip the balance in
favor of the employer's right to limit the speech.70 Additionally,
the Court determined that when a comment made by a public
employee involves a matter of legitimate public concern, a great
interest exists in preserving the employee's speech. 7' Applying
this criteria to the facts in Picketing, the majority held that any
interference with the state's interest was outweighed by Pickering's right to comment on school board policy without fear of
retaliatory dismissal. 72
Subsequent decisions by the Court attempted to delineate
the parameters of the Pickering balancing test.73 In Perry v.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568-73.
See id. at 569. The balancing test has been criticized for failing to indicate the
relative weights to be accorded to the interests of the state and its employees, and
for failing to specify the proper scope of the state's interest. See Note, Public Employees May Speak a Little Evil, 3 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 289, 297 (1980) [hereinafter Public
Employees]; Note, supra note 64, at 917-18.
68 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570.
69 See id. The Court reasoned that Pickering's statements were not directed towards anyone who "would normally be in contact [with him] in the course of his
work as teacher." Id. at 570-71. The Court further noted that Pickering was not in
a position where the maintenance of "discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers" would be jeopardized. Id. at 570.
70 See id. at 571. The Court found that Pickering's speech did not have a per se
detrimental effect on the board, and at most would not have an impact "beyond its
tendency to anger the [b]oard." Id. Moreover, as the more informed members of
the community, the Court recognized that teachers should be able to "speak out
freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal." Id. at 571-72.
71 Id. The Court noted that Pickering's attack on the allocation of school board
funds addressed a matter of public concern. Id. at 572. Because the issue would
be resolved through a referendum, the Court reasoned that free and open debate
on the issue was necessary. See id.
72 See id. at 572-73.
73 See, e.g., Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979);
66
67
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Sindermann, 4 the Court reinforced the notion that public employees, as informed citizens, should be free to voice their opinion on
matters of public concern.7 5 Sindermann, a nontenured college
professor, became involved in public disagreements over policies
of the school's Board of Regents. 76 After the board failed to renew his employment contract, Sindermann alleged that he was
denied employment because of his public criticism of the school's
policies, thus in violation of his first amendment rights.77 At the
outset, the Court noted that Sindermann had raised a valid constitutional issue despite his lack of tenure. 78 Relying on Pickering,
the Court then determined that a public servant's criticism of his
superiors on matters of public concern may warrant constitutional protection and may therefore be an impermissible basis for
his dismissal.79
While the Pickering Court did not specify the appropriate
burden of proof to be borne by each party under the balancing
test, the Court later confronted this issue in Mount Healthy City
School DistrictBoard of Education v. Doyle.8° In Mount Healthy, a nontenured teacher named Doyle, informed a local radio station of
the contents of a school memorandum that established a dress
code for teachers. 8' The radio station promptly announced the
Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
74 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
75 See id. at 598. See also Note, supra note 54, at 441-42.
76 Perry, 408 U.S. at 594-95. Specifically, as President of the Texas Junior College Teachers Association, Sindermann supported a proposal to elevate all junior
colleges in the state, including Odena State College, where he was employed, to
four-year status. Id. at 595. The college's Board of Regents at Odena opposed this
change. Id.
77 Id. at 595. Although the board did not release an official statement specifying
the reasons for their decision, they did issue a press release which alleged "insubordination" on the part of Sindermann. Id. at 595 & n.1.
78 See id. at 598. The Court explained that "[p]lainly, these allegations present a
bona fide constitutional claim. For this Court has held that a teacher's public criticism of his superiors on matters of public concern may be constitutionally protected and may, therefore, be an impermissible basis for termination of his
employment." Id. (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
79 Id. The Court therefore remanded the case, holding that the grant of summary judgment against Sindermann was improper. Id. See Note, supra note 54, at
441 (discussing the ramifications of the Sindermann decision).
80 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See Note, The Nonpartisan Freedom of Expression of Public
Employees, 76 MICH. L. REV. 365, 369-70 (1977) (explaining that because of the ambiguity in Pickering, lower federal courts were forced to assign weights to the variables in the balancing test).
81 Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282.
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policy in its news broadcast.82 When the school board failed to
renew Doyle's employment contract, they cited the news report,
among other incidents, as the reason for their decision.83
In applying the Pickering balancing test, the Supreme Court
agreed with the lower court that Doyle's communication was protected under the first amendment.84 The majority, however, rejected the lower court's finding on the burden of proof.8 5 The

Court reasoned that merely demonstrating that the employee's
speech was a factor in his dismissal could possibly place him "in a
better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing."'86 Accordingly, the Court held that the burden is on the
employee to demonstrate that his speech was the "motivating
factor" in his loss of employment. 87 After meeting this preliminary requirement, the Court determined that the employer must
then demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
employee could have been dismissed, absent his protected conduct.88 Thus, while clarifying the appropriate burden of proof,
the Mount Healthy decision presented an additional obstacle to
employees attempting to demonstrate infringements on their
82 Id. After the broadcast, Doyle apologized to the school principal, recognizing
that he should have communicated his intentions to the school before releasing the
information to the radio station. Id.
83 Id. at 282-83. The school board, in its statement of reasons for Doyle's dismissal, noted that the news broadcast "raised much concern not only within this
community, but also in neighboring communities." Id. at 283 n.l. The school
board also listed Doyle's "lack of tact in handling professional matters" and his use
"[of] obscene gestures to correct students" as additional support for its decision.
Id.
84 Id. at 284. The Court explained:
There is no suggestion by the Board that Doyle violated any established
policy, or that its reaction to his communication to the radio station was
anything more than an ad hoc response to Doyle's action in making the
memorandum public. We therefore accept the District Court's finding
that the communication was protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Id.
85 See id. at 285-86.
86 Id. at 285. Furthermore, the Court maintained that the "constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no worse a
position than if he had not engaged in the conduct." Id. at 285-86.
87 Id. at 287 (footnote omitted).
88 Id. The Court noted that a similar "but for" test is constitutionally mandated
in the criminal procedure context. Id. at 286-87 (citing Parker v. North Carolina,
397 U.S. 790 (1970); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Lyons v.
Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939)).
But see Note, supra note 61, at 384-85 (criticizing the criminal procedure analogy
drawn by the Court).
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first amendment rights.89
In a later clarification of the Pickering test, the Court extended the scope of protected speech to include communication
in a private environment."° In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated
School District,9 ' a school teacher was dismissed after criticizing
certain school board policies during private conversations with
her employer.9 2 Recognizing that speech on matters of public
concern is constitutionally protected, the Court held that this
protection also extends to an employee who chooses to communicate privately with her employer." Significantly, the majority
also articulated other factors which may be considered in arriving at the appropriate Pickering balance.94 In addition to the context of the speech, the Court noted that the "manner, time, and
place in which [the statement] is delivered" are also relevant
considerations. 95
The Court reformulated the elements of the Pickering test in
89 One commentator has explained:
The rationale for Mount Healthy is superficially appealing: An employee
should not be placed in a better position by exercising constitutional
rights than the employee would have occupied by having done nothing.... As a practical matter, however, Mount Healthy does far more than
prevent windfalls for employees who would have been terminated regardless of their protected speech ....

Consequently, if employers pro-

vide reasons for an employee's termination, they typically will offer
neutral, performance based reasons. To show that these reasons are
pretextual can be extremely difficult, in that few workers boast a perfect
record.... A patient public employer, assisted by able counsel, can be
rid of nearly any troublesome emp!oyee.
Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S.C.L.
REV. 3, 19 (1987).

For an analysis of the practical effect of the Mount Healthy decision, see Wolly,
What Hath Mount Healthy Wrought?, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 385 (1980).
90 See Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
91 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
92 Id. at 412-13. The school district contended that its decision was justified on
the basis of other incidents of misconduct which had occurred in the past. Id. at
412 n.2.
93 Id. at 413. Because the Givhan case was tried prior to the decision in Mount
Healthy, the Court remanded the case so that the causation element could be properly decided in light of the standards established in Mount Healthy. Id. at 416-17.
94 Id. at 415 & n.4.
95 Id. The Court explained that although both private and public expression are
protected under the first amendment, the interest balanced in each context will
necessarily differ. Id. The Court reasoned that "[w]hen a government employee
personally confronts his immediate superior, the employing agency's institutional
efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of the employee's message but
also by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered." Id. For an analysis of
the Givhan decision, see Note, Public Employees, supra note 67, at 308-10.
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the seminal case of Connick v. Myers.9 6 In Connick, assistant district
attorney Sheila Myers opposed her employer's decision to transfer her to another division of the criminal court.9 7 Consequently,
she circulated a questionnaire among her co-workers soliciting
their views on various office policies.9 8 Myers's employer thereafter discharged her, citing her "insubordination" in circulating
the questionnaire as the basis for dismissal. 9 9 Myers challenged
her employer's actions, contending that her termination violated
her constitutionally protected right to free speech.' 0
In upholding Myers's dismissal, the Court posited that as a
threshold issue, employee speech must involve a matter of public
The Court exconcern to enjoy constitutional protection.'
plained that "speech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung
of the hierarchy of First Amendment values' "o102 and accordingly, warrants strenuous review of possible constitutional violations.10 3 By contrast, when employee speech involves a personal
matter, and is not related to any social or political thought, it
does not enjoy the same protection. 0 4 To determine whether
employee speech involves a matter of public concern, the Court
held that the form, content and context of a given statement
0 5
must be evaluated.1
In reviewing the questionnaire, the Court determined that
the question posed by Myers concerning pressure to work on an
office-supported campaign addressed a matter of public concern
thus triggering further analysis.' 0 6 The Court then balanced My96

461 U.S. 138 (1983).

Id. at 140.
Id. at 141. The questionnaire consisted of fourteen questions addressing issues of office morale and fairness of office procedures, the need for a grievance
committee, the existence of a "rumor mill" within the office and pressure to work
on political campaigns. See id. at 155-56. One of Myers's supervisors characterized
her activities in distributing the questionnaire as causing a "mini-insurrection." Id.
at 141.
99 Id. District Attorney Connick also cited Myers's refusal to accept the transfer
as the basis for her dismissal. Id.
97
98

100 Id.
101 See id. at 143. The Court pointed out that Pickering and its progeny indicated

the importance of protecting speech on matters of public concern. Id.
102 Id. at 145 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913
(1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 146-48.
105 Id. at 147-48 (footnote omitted).
106 Id. In so ruling, the Court explained: "We have recently noted that official
pressure upon employees to work for political candidates not of the workers own
choice constitutes a coercion of belief in violation of fundamental constitutional
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ers's right to speak against the government's interest in effectively fulfilling its responsibilities to the public. 0 7 In so doing,
the Court considered the time, place and manner in which Myers
distributed her questionnaire. 0 8 Noting that Myers solicited responses during working hours, the Court found her actions increased the possibility that the efficient functioning of the office
was jeopardized. 0 9 The Court, in analyzing the context in which
the dispute arose, observed that the questionnaire was distributed as a result of a disagreement over Myers's proposed transfer
and characterized it simply as an "employee grievance."" 0 In
striking the balance in favor of the government, the Court determined that Myers's speech had the potential effect of disrupting
her office, undermining her supervisor's authority and damaging
close relationships, and was therefore not constitutionally
protected. " '
In dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the majority's approach
to defining public concern as well as their application of the Pickering test."t 2 According to Justice Brennan, the majority improperly considered the context of Myers's speech when evaluating
whether it touched upon a matter of public concern. "3 Addirights." Id. at 149 (citing Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 516-17 (1980); Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)). The Court also determined that the remaining questions regarding the trust that Myers's co-workers possessed in their superiors, office
morale and the need for a grievance committee did not involve matters of public
concern. Id. at 148.
107 Id. at 150-54.
108 Id. at 152.
109 Id. at 153 (emphasis added). The Court noted that even the potential for
undermining office functions may result in upholding the employer's disciplinary
action. See id. at 151-52. "[W]e do not see the necessity for an employer to allow
events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction
of working relationships is manifest before taking action." Id. at 152 (footnote
omitted).
110 Id. at 153-54. In light of the factual distinctions in every case, the Court emphasized that it was not attempting to "lay down a general standard against which
all such statements might be judged." Id. at 154 (quoting Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968)). In applying the balancing test, the Court reasoned that "the [s]tate's burden in justifying a particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee's expression." Id. at 150. Since Myers's
remark only touched upon a matter of public concern in a "limited sense," the
Court determined that Connick was not required to tolerate his employee's action
in this instance. Id. at 154.
'"
See id. at 151-54.
112 Id. at 156-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113 Justice Brennan explained that
the Court distorts the balancing analysis required under Pickeringby suggesting that one factor, the context in which a statement is made, is to
be weighted twice-first in determining whether an employee's speech
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tionally, the dissent disputed the Court's conclusion that only
one of Myers's questions touched on a matter of public concern. 4 Finally, Justice Brennan accused the majority of misapplying the Pickering test by examining only the potential for
disruption in the efficient functioning of the District Attorney's
office. " 5
Although Connick introduced a new framework for analyzing
employee speech claims, it offered only a sparse definition of the
new threshold requirement of "public concern."" 6 As a result,
lower courts analyzed public employee free speech claims without the benefit of clearly articulated guidelines." 7 It was against
this background of uncertainty that Rankin v. McPherson 18 was
decided.
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, began his analysis by
noting that the government, as an employer, cannot dismiss an
employee in violation of her first amendment right to free
speech." 9 By contrast, the Court recognized that in order to
maintain the effective functioning of the public service, the govaddresses a matter of public concern, and then in deciding whether the
statement adversely affected the government's interest as an employer.
Id. at 157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
114 Id. at 158 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan posited that the majority,
in so reasoning, "impermissibly narrows the class of subjects on which public employees may speak out without fear of retaliatory dismissal." Id.
115 Id.
116 See text accompanying supra notes 101-05.
' '7 Compare McMurphy v. City of Flushing, 802 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1986) (police
officer's comments to newspaper reporter that his paper printed "only what the city
officials wanted" was made out of spite and did not address a matter of public concern); Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508 (11 th Cir. 1986) (teacher's criticism of"collegiate registration" policy of high school a personal grievance and therefore did
not address a matter of public concern); Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, 745 F.2d 868
(4th Cir. 1984) (disclosure of an internal report by policeman to newspaper regarding low morale and other office problems in Emergency Operations Center did not
address a matter of public concern) with Lewis v. Harrison School Dist., 805 F.2d
310 (8th Cir. 1986) (principal's speech to school board criticizing superintendent's
decision to transfer principal's wife from junior high school to high school addressed a matter of public concern); Brown v. Texas A & M Univ., 804 F.2d 327
(5th Cir. 1988) (student employee speech on possible self-dealing of faculty members in university arguably addressed a matter of public concern); Eiland v. City of
Montgomery, 797 F.2d 953 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3263 (1987)
(poetry composed of police officer mimicking mayor during local election addressed a matter of public concern).
For a discussion of lower federal courts' applications of Connick, including the
weights assigned to various elements in the balancing test, see Massaro, supra note
89, at 20 & nn.95-96.
118 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987).
119 Id. at 2896 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). Justice
Marshall was joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens.
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ernment must have authority to make appropriate personnel decisions. 120 Citing the analysis set forth in Pickering and its
progeny, the Court determined that a balance between the rights
of the citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern, and
the state's interests in the efficient functioning of the workplace,
must be achieved. 12 1 Initially, the majority noted that to warrant
constitutional protection, a public employee's speech must ad122
dress a matter of public concern.
Focusing on McPherson's remark in context, the majority
determined that her statement "plainly dealt with a matter of
public concern."' 123 To support this conclusion, Justice Marshall
initially observed that McPherson made her comment in the
course of a discussion concerning the policies of the Reagan administration. 1 24 Additionally, the Court noted that McPherson's
comment was prompted by the news of an assassination attempt
on the President. 1 25 Moreover, the Court explained that in determining whether McPherson's speech addresses a matter of
public concern, the controversial or inappropriate nature of her
statement is irrelevant. 126 Thus, Justice Marshall asserted that
McPherson should not be denied constitutional protection sim120 Id. The Court maintained that to "review... every personnel decision made
by a public employer could, in the long run, hamper the performance of public
functions." Id.
121 Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983); Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). The Court declared that such a balance "is necessary in order to accommodate the dual role of the public employer as a provider
of public services and as a government entity operating under the constraints of the
First Amendment." Id.
122 Id. at 2896-97 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).
123 Id. at 2897. The Court noted that the district court, in its second hearing of
the case, did not explicitly apply the elements of the balancing test since they found
that McPherson's speech did not address a matter of public concern. Id. at 2897
n.8. Instead, the district court stated: "I don't think it is a matter of public concern
to approve even more to the second attempt at assassination." Id. Additionally,
the Court noted that the district court merely determined that McPherson's comments were "something more than political hyperbole. They expressed such dislike of a high government official as to be violent words, in context." Id. The Court
characterized such factual findings as "ambiguous" and "unintelligible in First
Amendment terms." Id. Moreover, the majority pointed out that the lower court's
factual findings are subject to constitutional review. Id.
124 Id. at 2897.
125 Id. at 2898. In this regard, the Court characterized McPherson's speech as a
response to an event of "heightened public attention." Id. The Court also emphasized that the private nature of McPherson's speech did not alter the constitutional
analysis. Id. at 2898 & n. I1 (citing Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist.,
439 U.S. 410 (1979)).
126 Id. The Court also noted that McPherson's remarks were not punishable
under federal law. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 871 (a), 2385 (1982)).
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ply because her
comment was not a positive critique of govern27
ment policy.'

Having met the threshold requirement of addressing a matter of public concern, the Court proceeded to analyze McPherson's speech by balancing the competing interests of her and her
employer. 28 In so doing, the Court noted that the time, place
and manner of a given expression, as well as the context in which
it arose, must be considered. 29 The majority also stated that
certain state interests may outweigh a public employee's interest
in exercising her first amendment rights. 30 For example, when a
statement has the effect of interfering with office productivity,
impairing personnel relationships or impeding the speaker's job
performance, the Court declared that the state's interests are
3
strengthened. 1 '

Finding the state's interests insufficient to justify McPherson's discharge, the Court noted that there was no evidence to
indicate that her statement interfered with the efficient operation
of the constable's office.'3 2 Relying on the testimony of Constable Rankin, the Court observed that interference with office functions was not a consideration in his decision to discharge
McPherson. 13 Additionally, the Court determined that McPherson's comments did not have the effect of tainting the public image of the constable's office.' 1 4 Rather, the Court noted that
McPherson had engaged in a private conversation with a co-employee in an area that was not accessible to the public.' 3 5
In assessing the circumstances surrounding McPherson's
127 See id. In so finding, the Court articulated that " 'debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and ... may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.'" Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 2898-99 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152-53 (1983); Givhan
v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 n.4 (1979)).
130 See id. at 2899.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. Specifically, the Court noted that "[t]he Constable was evidently not
afraid that McPherson had disturbed or interrupted other employees-he did not
inquire to whom [she] had made the remark and testified that he 'was not concerned who she had made it to.' " Id. (citation omitted).
134 Id. The Court declared that "[niot only was McPherson's discharge unrelated
to the functioning of the office, it was not based on any assessment by the constable
that the remark demonstrated a character trait that made [her] unfit to perform her
work." Id. (footnote omitted).
135 Id. Moreover, the Court observed that there was no evidence that any other
employee who worked in the office, except Jackson, had heard the comment. Id.
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dismissal, the Court concluded that Rankin fired McPherson on
the basis of the content of her speech.136 In so finding, the Court
pointed out that Constable Rankin had expressed great concern
that McPherson had "meant it" when she commented on the attempted assassination of the President."' In discharging an employee under these circumstances, however, the Court asserted
that the weight given to the content of the speech must vary with
the type of role that the employee plays in the agency. 3 8 More
specifically, the Court held that when an employee, such as McPherson, "serves no confidential, policymaking, or public contact
role," the state's interest in suppressing the employee's speech is
weakened.' 3 9 As a clerical employee, the Court reasoned that
McPherson's position was only marginally related to the effective
functioning of the constable's office.1 4 ° Considering the limited
law enforcement function of the agency, the nature of McPherson's statement and her position in the office, the Court cona statement
cluded that McPherson's right to make such
4
outweighed any countervailing state interests.' '
Justice Powell wrote a separate opinion concurring in the
Court's judgment. 14 2 Observing that McPherson had engaged in
a purely private conversation, he posited that the extensive analysis undertaken by the majority was unnecessary. 4 3 Justice Powell, however, agreed with the Court's conclusion, to the extent
that such constitutional review was required. 14 4 Most importantly, he approved of the majority's determination that the
136 Id. (emphasis in original). The Court explained that "[w]hile the facts underlying Rankin's discharge are, despite extensive proceedings in the District Court,
still somewhat unclear, it is undisputed that he fired McPherson based on the content
of her speech." Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
137 Id. at 2899-900 (emphasis in original). The Court found that Rankin simply
concluded that McPherson "was not a suitable employee to have in a law enforcement agency." Id. at 2900.
138 Id. The Court explained that "[t]he burden of caution employees bear with
respect to the words they speak will vary with the extent of authority and public
accountability the employee's role entails." Id.

139

Id.

See id. The Court noted, however, that "[t]his is not to say that clerical employees are insulated from discharge where their speech, taking the acknowledged
factors into account, truly injures the public interest in the effective functioning of
the public employer." Id. at 2900 n.18.
140

141

Id. at 2900.

142

Id. at 2900-01 (Powell, J., concurring).

143 Id. at 2901 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138

(1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
144 Id.

1989]

NOTE

399

speech addressed a matter of public concern. 145 Moreover, according to Justice Powell, constitutional protection should generally extend to private conversation "at all levels of the
workplace," since the risk that such speech might interfere with
the efficient functioning of a public office is remote. 146 Thus, Justice Powell concluded that McPherson's private comments were
protected under the first amendment. 147
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia initially criticized the
majority for "significantly and irrationally" expanding the definition of public concern.1 48 The dissent claimed that the district
court, by describing McPherson's remark as "violent words"
rather than "mere political hyperbole," properly determined that
her comment did not address a matter of public concern. 4 '
Characterizing the lower court's conclusion as "reasonable and
supported by the evidence," the dissent described the majority's
finding as a "distortion of both the record and the Court's prior
decisions. '
The dissent first maintained that the conversation preceding
McPherson's remark did not alter the status of her speech.' 5 ' In
Justice Scalia's opinion, the majority erred by construing McPherson's entire conversation with her co-worker as evidence of
the content of her speech. 152 More appropriately, the dissent posited that McPherson's criticisms of the President's policies only
145 Id. Justice Powell further stated that "[i]f a statement is on a matter of public
concern ...it will be an unusual case where the employer's legitimate interests will
be so great as to justify punishing an employee for this type of private speech that
routinely takes place at all levels in the workplace." Id.
146 Id. In fact, Justice Powell explained that "[t]he risk that a single, off-hand
comment directed to only one other worker will lower morale, disrupt the work
force, or otherwise undermine the mission of the office borders on the fanciful."
Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 2902 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justices White and O'Connor. The dissent further criticized the majority for "carv[ing] out a new and very large class of employees- . . . those in
'nonpolicymaking' positions-who, [according to the majority's decision], can
never be disciplined for statements that fall within the Court's expanded definition." Id.
149 Id. at 2903 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (citing McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233,
1235 (5th Cir. 1986), aft'd, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987)).
150 Id. at 2902-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151 See id. at 2903 (Scalia, J., dissenting). More specifically, Justice Scalia stated
that there "[is] no basis for the Court's suggestion . . . that McPherson's criticisms
of the President's policies that immediately preceded the remark can illuminate it in
such fashion as to render it constitutionally protected." Id.
152 See id. (emphasis in original).
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revealed the motive for her subsequent comment. 15
The dissent next proceeded to distinguish McPherson's
comment from other statements previously made by public employees which legitimately addressed matters of public concern. 54 Justice Scalia noted, for example, that the speech in
Connick concerned pressure to work in political campaigns and
the comment in Pickering involved criticism of school board financing policies.' 55 By contrast, the dissent asserted that McPherson's statement was closer to other types of speech which do
not enjoy first amendment protection, such as advocacy of force
or violence. 156 Unlike speech "lying within the 'heart' of the First
Amendment's protection,"' 57 the dissent posited that McPherson's speech fell squarely within that unprotected category of expression which can neither
be criminalized nor addresses a
8
matter of public concern.15

Moreover, the dissent challenged the majority's method of
classifying McPherson's comment as speech addressing a matter
of public concern, contending that the Court failed to adequately
explain how it arrived at its conclusion. 1 59 Justice Scalia rejected
the Court's reasoning that when a comment follows an attempted
assassination, an event of "heightened public attention," it nec153 Id. (emphasis in original). The dissent stated that the "criticisms merely reveal the speaker's motive for expressing the desire that the next attempt on the President's life succeed, in the same way that a political assassin's remarks to his victim
before pulling the trigger might reveal a motive for that crime." Id. (emphasis in
original). The dissent therefore concluded that "the majority's magical transformation of the motive for McPherson's statement into its content [was] as misguided as
viewing a political assassination preceded by a harangue as nothing more than a
strong denunciation of the victim's political views." Id. (emphasis in original).
154 Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983); Givhan v. Western
Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413 (1979); Mount Healthy City Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 595
(1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 566 (1968)).

155 Id.

156 Id. (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591-92 (1952)). The dissent also listed assassination threats against the President (citing Frohwerk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919)); fighting words (citing Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)); and epithets or personal abuse (citing
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)) as similarly unprotected categories of speech. Id.
157 Id. at 2903-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
147 (1983)).
158 Id. at 2904 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147
(1983)).
159 Id. The dissent maintained that the Court "does not explain how a statement
expressing approval of a serious and violent crime-assassination of the President-can possibly fall within [the] category [of public concern]." Id. (emphasis in
original).
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essarily addresses a matter of public concern. 16 ' To condone
such reasoning, according to the dissent, would serve to elevate
any speech with which the public might be "concerned" to a constitutionally protected status. 16 1 Such an approach, the dissent
concluded, irrationally expands the definition of public
62
concern. 1
While maintaining that McPherson's speech did not meet the
threshold requirement of addressing a matter of public concern,
the dissent nonetheless proceeded to analyze McPherson's
speech by balancing the interests of both parties. 16 3 In so doing,
Justice Scalia emphasized that the issue was whether Rankin's interest "in preventing the expression of such statements in his agency outweighed [McPherson's] First Amendment interest in making the
statement."' 1 64 The dissent declared that under this analysis, the
severity of the sanction imposed upon the employee is irrelevant
65
should the interests of the government ultimately prevail.
Applying the balancing test, the dissent determined that the
interests of Constable Rankin in preventing the statement outweighed McPherson's right to freedom of speech.' 66 Stressing
the law enforcement function of the constable's office, Justice
Scalia contended that Constable Rankin had a strong interest in
suppressing any statements made by his employees which condoned or encouraged violent actions.' 6 7 Additionally, the dissent
emphasized that within the confines of a law enforcement agency,
such a statement could have the potential for undermining office
relations. 168 Moreover, the dissent hypothesized that to a limited
160 Id. Justice Scalia asserted: "I cannot respond to this progression of reasoning
except to say that I don't understand it." Id.
161 See id. The dissent posited that to accept such reasoning would "obviously
[be] untenable," since the public would clearly be "concerned" about an attempted
assassination of the President. Id. The dissent emphasized its point by declaring
that "[t]he public would be 'concerned' about a statement threatening to blow up
the local federal building ...yet that kind of 'public concern' does not entitle such
a statement to any First Amendment protection at all." Id.
162 See id.
163
164

Id.

165

Id.

Id. (emphasis in original). The dissent maintained that the court incorrectly
described the balancing test as whether "Rankin's interest in discharging[McPherson]
outweighed her rights under the First Amendment." Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 2905 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2904 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia asserted that such interest
exists, "regardless of whether the statements actually interfere with office operations at the time they are made or demonstrate character traits that make the
speaker unsuitable for law enforcement work." Id.
168 Id. at 2904-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In fact, the dissent pointed out that
166
167
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extent, McPherson might have some contact with the public in
the course of her duties.' 69 In light of these considerations, Justice Scalia contended that McPherson's comment might have the
effect of undermining public confidence in the constable's 17office
0
and should therefore be denied constitutional protection.
Concluding his dissent, Justice Scalia challenged the majority's assertion that nonpolicy-making employees pose little threat
to a public agency's successful function.' 7 ' To the contrary, the
dissent reasoned that an employee such as McPherson can damage working relationships and undermine public confidence in an
agency to the same extent as policy-making employees. 7 ' The
result of creating an exception for nonpolicy-making employees,
according to the dissent, will be to allow such employees to freely
advocate ideas which are contrary to the goals of public
service.' 7 3
The Supreme Court's adjudication of public employees' free
speech claims illustrates that the public sector is a difficult environment for the Court to articulate sound constitutional principles. Indeed, it was not until 1968 in Pickering that the Court
developed a test to balance an employee's interest in speaking in
the workplace against the government's interest in promoting the
efficiency of the public service it performs. 1 74 And while Pickering
stressed that it was not "lay[ing] down a general standard against
which all statements may be judged,"' 7 5 the Connick case, decided
just fifteen years later, did just that- imposed the threshold rea matter of
quirement that all public employee speech address
17 6
public concern to enjoy constitutional protection.
The public concern requirement of Connick is an illogical extension of Picketing and the immediate case law which developed
from that decision. While the Connick Court cited the need for
McPherson's remark was brought to Constable Rankin's attention because the deputy reporting the incident was "very upset" by it. Id. at 2905 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. Justice Scalia characterized such a proposition as "simply contrary to reason and experience." Id.
172 See id.
173 See id. To illustrate his contention, Justice Scalia claimed that the consequence of the majority's decision will be to allow "nonpolicymaking employees of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission . . .to make remarks on the job
approving of racial discrimination, [and to allow] nonpolicymaking employees of
the Selective Service System to advocate noncompliance with the draft laws." Id.
174 See text accompanying supra notes 62-72.
175 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
176 See text accompanying supra notes 96-111.
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efficient management of the workplace as justification for its new
standard, 7 7 the public concern requirement precludes inquiry
into that very matter. Instead, it directs the analysis to the nature
of the speech at issue, by focusing on the context, form and content of the employee speech. 17 8 Thus, under Connick, a particular
statement can be deprived of constitutional protection for failing
to address a matter of public concern without having caused any
actual disruption in the workplace- arguably the controlling issue in speech claims in this area.
Faced with the guidance of the Pickering balancing test as well
as the newly developed threshold test of Connick, the Rankin
Court decided that a statement approving of the assassination of
the President addressed a matter of public concern, and furthermore, that it was entitled to constitutional protection. 179 At first
glance, the Rankin decision appears, as the dissent charged, to
"significantly and irrationally"' 8 0 expand the concept of public
concern. Indeed, McPherson's statement was unlike the letter
criticizing educational policies protected in Pickering" or the
legislative testimony of a professor protected in Sindermann. 8 2
Arguably, McPherson's statement is less "[essential] to self-gov177 The Connick Court explained: "When employee expression cannot be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
178 In discussing the flaws inherent in the Connick test, one commentator has
explained:
In the public employee speech context, however, if the speech is of
public concern, the Court balances- a process which some commentators criticize as less protective than normal first amendment scrutiny of
nongovernmental speech. This inconsistent treatment may be justified
by the special nature of the public workplace setting and judicial concern for managerial and workplace efficiency, as is suggested by the language in Connick, Pickering and Rankin. The public concern requirement,
however, does not directly address this problem because it focuses on
the nature of the speech in question rather than on whether the speech
interfered with workplace efficiency. Formulating the threshold inquiry
in a way that prevents judicial consideration of the actual disruptive impact of the employee's speech thus runs contrary to the Supreme
Court's objectives.
Lee, supra note 60, at 1125.
179 Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2900.
180 Id. at 2902 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See text accompanying supra notes 148-62.
181 For a discussion of the Pickering decision, see text accompanying supra notes
62-72.
182 For a discussion of the Sindermann decision, see text accompanying supra notes
74-79.
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ernment"' 8 3 than Connick's speech on adverse working conditions
which the Court described as a "personal grievance" not entitled
to constitutional protection. Upon closer examination, however,
the Rankin decision, may, in effect, have signalled a welcomed
retreat to the general balancing standards announced in Pickering.
The analytical flaw in the Rankin decision appears to stem
from the Court's adherence to the public concern requirement of
Connick. In order to balance the competing interests in favor of
McPherson and assert that her comment had in fact caused no
significant disruption in the workplace, the Court was forced to
define her speech as one addressing a matter of public concern.
The Court did so without developing the meaning of "public
concern" in a reasoned manner, and without drawing on prior
case law in defining the concept. Rather, the Rankin majority abruptly arrived at a conclusion which it did not adequately explain:
McPherson's speech addressed a matter of public concern since it
followed "what is certainly a matter of heightened public atten' 18 4
tion-an assassination attempt on the life of the President."
The inability of the Rankin Court to fashion the parameters of its
own standard suggests that the public concern requirement is inappropriate as a threshold inquiry.
Indeed, commentators reviewing the public concern requirement espoused in Rankin and Connick have criticized its vagueness
as well as its subjectivity. 18 5 Moreover, as a threshold inquiry
designed, ultimately, to protect first amendment rights, the public concern requirement has been characterized as unnecessarily
narrow. 8 6 Although the majority in Rankin emphasized that
speech on "public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wideSee Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
See Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2898 (footnote omitted). In response to the majority's reasoning, the dissent expressed: "I cannot respond to this progression of
reasoning except to say that I do not understand it." Id. at 2904 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
185 See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 89, at 27-33.
186 One commentator has explained:
A second problem with the matter of public concern restriction is
that the categorization is too narrow .... Indeed, even in the obscenity
area the Court has eschewed a restrictive approach to free speech and
concluded that states can proscribe only material that, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. This test embraces speech of "social value," which would not be limited to speech
that involves "public" issues of political or social change.
Massaro, supra note 89, at 29 (footnote omitted).
183
184

1989]

NOTE

405

open,' ' 7 the Court has, in other contexts, accorded protection
to expression having only social, artistic or literary value.' 8 8
Under the public concern threshold issue summarily reinforced
by the Rankin Court, however, an employee speaking on a purely
private matter, having no public significance, is denied the opportunity to demonstrate that her first amendment interests
should be protected.
Had Rankin been decided on the heels of Pickering, and decided under its precepts, the Court would have arrived at the
same conclusion yet could have approached McPherson's free
speech claim in a more principled fashion. Unconstrained by the
public concern requirement, the Court's emphasis on the actual
disruption in the workplace, as a factor in the balancing process,
would be consistent with reasons advanced by the Picketing Court
in limiting first amendment rights in the public employee context. By choosing to analyze McPherson's claim within the existing Connick framework, however, the Rankin decision adds only
more confusion to the already ambiguous concept of public concern. Thus, while the Rankin decision might signal a victory for
employees' first amendment rights, its vitality is necessarily limited until the Court reformulates an approach to public employee
free speech claims which is consistent with its objectives.
Madeline E. Cox
187 Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2898 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964)).
188 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1972) ("The First Amendment
protects works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value, regardless of whether the government or a majority of the people
approve of the ideas these works represent.").

